Department Seminar Series - Elaine Hollensbe - University of Cincinnati - Thursday, May 23rd 2019

The Management Department

Department Seminar Series

Elaine Hollensbe

University of Cincinnati

Thursday, May 23rd 2019

   Room LE CLUB  at 10:00 am

Theme:  “Publishing Qualitative Work in Top-Tier Journals - 23rd May, 10.00 - 12.00”

  Abstract:  One of the most challenging aspects of qualitative research is telling a convincing and compelling story that clears the hurdle for contribution in a top journal.  In this workshop, I will present strategies for developing strong qualitative papers and getting them published in top outlets.  In particular, I will discuss tactics for designing the study, managing the coding and analysis process, writing up the paper, ensuring rigor and trustworthiness, and responding to reviewers.  The workshop will include an interactive component and time at the end for participants’ questions and discussion.  All are welcome to attend, including those currently working on or considering a qualitative project, those who review or might review qualitative work, or quantitative researchers who would like to learn more about qualitative methods.

Department Seminar Series - Ivana Naumovska - INSEAD - Tuesday, May 28th 2019

The Management Department

Department Seminar Series

Ivana Naumovska

INSEAD

Tuesday, May 28th 2019

   Room N517  at 10:00 am

Theme:  “WHEN AN INDUSTRY PEER IS ACCUSED OF FINANCIAL MISCONDUCT: RECONCILING THE CONTAGION AND COMPETITION EFFECTS ON BLAMELESS FIRMS”

   Abstract: What are the performance consequences for blameless firms when an industry peer is accused of corporate misconduct? Research on corporate misconduct has revealed that accusations of industry peers generate negative consequences to blameless firms (contagion effect). In turn, research on competitive dynamics implies that such accusations can benefit blameless firms that compete with these industry peers (competition effect). We reconcile these perspectives by arguing that the market value of a blameless firm is dually shaped by the contagion and competition effects, depending on the extent of market overlap between the accused industry peer and the blameless firm. Using fine-grained product data, we analyze the stock market returns of 233 software firms following all the accusations of financial misconduct by their industry peers in the course of a decade. We demonstrate that the negative contagion effect increases with the product market overlap between the accused and blameless firms, but only up to a point, beyond which the positive competition effect becomes stronger. We further show that the competition effect becomes relatively more pronounced, the more fine-grained the market classification used to assess the market overlap. Our study unpacks the heterogeneity of spillover effects across blameless firms and enhances understanding of the interplay of contagion and competition following misconduct by industry peers.

Department Seminar Series - David Stark - Warwick University - Tuesday, May 14th 2019

The Management Department

Department Seminar Series

David Stark

Warwick University

Tuesday, May 14th 2019

   Room LE CLUB  at 10:00 am

Theme:  “Without Inclusion, Racial Bias Blocks Learning”

  Abstract: Racial diversity is often hailed as a boon to the performance of groups, organizations, and markets, but its alleged benefits have been slow to materialize. We study the role of inclusion: In diverse settings, are members of an ethnic majority reluctant to learn from members of a minority group? We answer in three studies, in which US-based White adults are asked to make an incentivized choice after observing a similar decision by two peers, who are identifiable only by their first names: either White- or Black-sounding. Unbeknown to the chooser, the peers always make better decisions, so their choices should be copied. However, we find that Whites are far less likely to learn from their Black peers compared to White peers (n=296). We suggest that the bias can be reversed if Whites observe that the Black peers repeatedly perform well (n=208) or when Whites are apprised in advance of the Black peers’ performance (n=252). To reap benefits, we conclude, diversity must be accompanied by informed inclusion. We discuss implications to attempts at racial and ethnic diversity in scientific, educational and other organizations.    (Co-authored with Sheen Levine, University of Texas-Dallas, and Charlotte Reypens, University of Warwick).

Les podcasts d'ESSEC Knowledge

ESSEC Knowledge a récemment débuté la production de podcasts. Laurent Bibard et moi-même avons contribué à l'une des deux productions expérimentales. Cette nouvelle série s'intitule "Be in the Know !"

Nous vous souhaitons une bonne écoute ! 

Vous les trouverez également dans Spotify ou dans iTunes.

Department Seminar Series - Martin Kilduff - UCL - Tuesday, May 7th 2019

The Management Department

Department Seminar Series

Martin Kilduff

UCL

Tuesday, May 7th 2019

   Room LE CLUB  at 10:00 am

Theme:  “When the Personality of Others Matters:

Self-Monitoring, Homophily, and the Origins of Network Structure”

   Abstract: We investigate whether and how the personality of the coworkers with whom an individual interacts helps explain the extent to which the individual comes to occupy advantageous positions in social networks. We suggest that differences in self-monitoring personality affect social structure beyond the reach of the individual. We test this prediction in two studies. In Study 1, we use cross-sectional data on advice relations in an organization to show that self-monitoring is associated with network popularity and homophily: high self-monitors attract advice requests mainly from highs, and low self-monitors from lows, although high self-monitors receive more advice requests overall. In Study 2, we use longitudinal data on advice relations within a cohort of young-professionals in a post-graduate program, to show that high self-monitors come to occupy network brokerage roles to the extent that they are sought for advice by other high self-monitors. This happens, we suggest, because their high self-monitoring contacts tend to remain unconnected from each other. At the same time, the extent to which high self-monitors are sought for advice by low self-monitors tends to explain the likelihood of the highs to remain embedded in closed networks. This happens, we suggest, because their low self-monitoring contacts are more likely to interact with each other.